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The paradox of repression is often more a cultural phenomenon than 
a political one, and its occurrence more a consequence of cultural 
processes than straightforward political confrontation. As Doron 
Shultziner notes in chapter 3, repressive events often become transfor-
mational, radically shifting the political climate and upending long-
held attitudes, beliefs, and even social structures and institutions. 
They are what Victor Turner (1967) calls “liminal moments” in which 
the world is turned upside down. They open up space for more perma-
nent transformations.
This chapter focuses on the culture of repression and its manage-
ment—that is, the more symbolic aspects of repression and its back-
fire, seen more as a dance between a power and its dissidents, a regime 
and its insurgents, as they contest the frames used to make meaning 
of events and social arrangements, of justice and injustice. We will 
examine the two sides of this framing struggle: first (in this chapter) 
by focusing on efforts of change activists to choreograph actions in 
order to enhance the backfire effect of repression, and then (in chap-
ter 8) by examining the growing efforts of elites to be more strategic 
about how they use repression in order to mitigate the effects of its 
potentially backfiring.
Repression Management and Preemptive Choreography
In this volume, we address the management of repression by social 
movements trying to bring about change in a system. It is perhaps 
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more apropos to refer to this strategic practice as the “arts” of facing 
repression, since “management” conjures up notions of clean, efficient 
processes and predictable causes and effects. Hardly anything could 
be farther from the truth in the give and take of political contention. 
However, we follow James Jasper’s (2010) lead in subscribing to the 
idea that tactical choices are important. In the harried flow of con-
flict, strategic decisions are made in a whirl of incomplete information, 
past experience, cultural taste, biographical experience, and recipro-
cal anticipation. Nevertheless, there remains the possibility of “vir-
tuosity,” and chains of choices that can influence the trajectory of a 
conflict in desired directions. “Artfulness is crucial here, for people 
make choices, and those choices matter” (Jasper 2010, 320). Tactical 
choices within social movement organizations (SMOs) that anticipate 
and attempt to mitigate or transform repression to their own advan-
tage command our attention in this chapter, and we turn to the theo-
retical models of framing and cultural pragmatics, both of which trace 
their lineage back to Goffman’s (1959, 1974) work on dramaturgy and 
frames (cf. Vinthagen 2015).
Repression can jolt one’s sense of identity and sharpen the sense of 
belonging or not belonging to one of the parties of a conflict—a move-
ment participant, a member of the establishment seeking to mitigate 
or destroy the movement, and so forth. An uninvolved bystander may 
then decide either to avoid assiduously any connection or appearance 
of connection to the movement, or, alternatively, to become involved 
because of a perceived resonance between their identity and the frame 
proffered by movement participants. Repression gets people’s atten-
tion and precipitates a choice regarding a movement campaign. Simi-
larly, a member of the elite perpetrating oppression may find their 
identity shifting if they become sufficiently repulsed by the brutality 
of the repression. This is, of course, exactly the kind of frame shift 
that movement leaders will try to facilitate. It is worth noting that 
most authorities—even the most authoritarian among them—recog-
nize that there are limits to repression based on their understanding 
of public opinion and the popular legitimacy on which their author-
ity rests. They tend to reserve repression as a measure of last resort 
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to avoid triggering the very social psychological effects that we are 
addressing in this chapter.
One primary task of nonviolent actionists, we argue, is to set the 
stage, so to speak, on which repression takes place. Erving Goffman’s 
(1974) dramaturgical approach to interpreting social interaction sheds 
light on the process by which movement actors attempt to manage 
the repression they almost inevitably face as they confront and try to 
change unjust systems. Just as Goffman observes that individuals and 
groups engage in impression management through a variety of dra-
maturgical tactics, so too we see SMO actors engaging in repression 
management.
Cultural Pragmatics and Performance Theory
In his work on cultural pragmatics, Alexander (2004, 540) re-energizes 
the field of performance studies and argues that in increasingly complex 
differentiated societies, public performance of rituals is increasingly 
problematic as symbolic action becomes professionalized and discon-
nected from communal life, leading to “the appearance of greater arti-
fice and planning. Performative action becomes more achieved and 
less automatic.” Alexander focuses his attention on what is necessary 
for actors to align various aspects of performance so that they connect 
with audiences in convincing and authentic ways. If actors can achieve 
this fusion of elements, the performance becomes ritual-like in that 
the audience, through psychological identification with the authors, 
cathect to the meaning intended by the performers. Successful perfor-
mances fuse actors with audiences against background representations 
through means of symbolic production. Alexander also notes that the 
public sphere has become increasingly available to a broader range 
of political actors. As Shakespeare has said, “All the world’s a stage.” 
This applies equally to SMOs, and Alexander cites one of the most 
prominent nonviolent actions in US history, the Boston Tea Party, as 
an example of the way in which a collective action dramatized colo-
nists’ resistance to British rule. Such successful performances enact 
scripts that draw on collective background representations, “the uni-
verse of basic narratives and codes and the cookbook of rhetorical 
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configurations from which every performance draws” (Alexander 
2004, 550). Successful scripts coordinate narratives and codes to con-
dense meaning into symbols and narratives that are agonistic, pitting 
good against evil.
The choice of symbols used in action is critical to its overall effect, 
as it is central to the communicative capacity of the event. It is also 
important to remember that each action is situated in a web of mean-
ing that is connected to all other possible interpretations of the event, 
including all possible reactions by the regime. George Lakey (1973) 
describes a campaign against chemical warfare in the United States 
in 1970. Campaigners wanted to plant pine trees on the grounds of 
the Edgewood arsenal, a chemical weapons facility in Maryland. After 
repeated confrontations and arrests, the arsenal eventually accepted 
the tree. Lakey asserts, “The point is that if rival symbols were to be 
juggled, the tree had them licked before they started. In symbol lan-
guage, when the tree said life, all Edgewood could say back was death, 
no matter how daintily it picked its phrases” (107). Lakey calls this 
creative and careful use of choreography “propaganda of the deed.”
So far, the application of performance theory to social movements 
has revolved around issues of mobilization, essentially extending 
framing theory to the dramatic potential in collective action. Eyer-
man (2006) argues that movements progress by “fusing individuals 
into collectives and collectives into focused and directed social forces. 
This is accomplished through social conventions like public demon-
strations and their constitutive ritual practices” (207). We, of course, 
agree that protests and demonstrations can become “ritual-like,” 
building solidarity and calling people to further action (Alexander 
2004). However, we also believe there is a great deal of analysis to be 
done regarding the tactical choices that SMOs make. Eyerman (2006, 
203) ventures into this territory citing Gandhi’s choice of traditional
clothing to challenge Western images of masculinity and to disarm
opponents. Gandhi was a master of making dramatic strategic choices
that were symbolically rich (see Kurtz 2008; Johansen and Martin
2008). His preference for traditional clothing was significant not only
in relation to potential Western allies and opponents but also because
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it symbolized in dramatic ways for a mass movement of Indians the 
injustice of British economic policy regarding the cotton trade in 
India. He turned religious practices like fasting, praying, and going 
on pilgrimage into protest tactics, and secular activities like spinning 
into symbolic acts that were simultaneously political and sacred. The 
low-risk tactic of spinning one’s own clothes became the predominant 
symbol of participation in the Indian freedom movement, and Gandhi 
regarded it as a kind of spiritual meditation practice as well as a mode 
of resistance. Even though everyone knew what the tactic meant, and 
the Congress Party handed out free spinning wheels, it was impossible 
for the authorities to arrest people for spinning their own clothes.
We want to build on work that reveals the cultural underpin-
nings of social movement, and in this chapter we restrict ourselves to 
examining ways in which certain symbolically rich tactics can draw on 
widely recognized narratives that dramatize a problem (e.g., religious, 
ethical, or cultural) to mobilize public opinion, particularly in situa-
tions of repression. In other words, these tactics are tailored for the 
possibility of repression, either preventing it or helping to ensure that 
repressive events are interpreted in ways that favor the movement.
Eyerman (2006, 210) asserts that “social movements move even 
those who view them from afar, but whom they move and in which 
direction is not something easy to control or predict. The world that 
is watching is multifaceted, and the media which mediates the message 
adds its own refraction. Movements move, but in differing directions.” 
Indeed, as W. I. Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas said, if people 
“define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences” (1928, 572); it is 
mutually constructed out of the dialectical dance between authorities 
and dissidents (Lyng and Kurtz 1985). As Brian Martin (2007, 189–90) 
asserts in his book Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire, regimes can 
be highly adept at framing and “agenda management,” especially since 
they usually have unequaled access to the media. He details common 
methods, such as covering up acts of repression, stigmatizing activist 
groups, seeming to concede with small gestures or meaningless inqui-
ries, and bribing or intimidating critics.
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We agree the challenge is difficult, but it is not impossible, even 
against formidable elites; nor is it so unpredictable as to preclude a 
field of study that focuses on the strategy and execution under duress 
of effective symbolic action, or repression management. What we are 
proposing is that much of repression management is in fact the pre-
emptive management of the perception of repression. In this section, 
we explore the dimensions along which movement activists attempt 
to manage repression by identifying four ways in which choreography 
and strategic tactical choices can contribute to repression management.
1.  Activists can set the stage by framing their cause in popular
ways and encouraging the development of ethnic, national-
ist, or other collective identities. Thus, when the movement is
attacked, bystanding publics who have adopted the overarching
nationalist or ethnic identity are more likely to feel as if the
attack were directed at them as well.
2.  Careful choreography of tactics can contribute to diagnostic
framing in which the action itself labels or reveals injustice.
Repression only makes the frame resonate even more strongly.
3.  Preexisting collective identities can be activated by choreograph-
ing events that symbolically or ritualistically express deeply
held, sometimes sacred, identities, raising the likelihood that
repression against fellow followers will generate moral outrage.
4.  Tactics can be designed to encourage ethical dilemmas by fram-
ing confrontation in ways that force agents of the regime to
reconcile repression, on the one hand, with their own ethical
systems, on the other. When repression occurs, it is more easily
interpreted as violating shared ethical norms and can precipitate
divisions within the ranks of the regime or encourage sympathy
for the movement among bystanders who subscribe to the same
ethical system.
Before going any further, we must emphasize that the first rule in suc-
cessful repression management is to remain nonviolent. This in itself is 
a fundamental choreographic decision. Nonviolent discipline is cru-
cial for helping to ensure that any violent repression is understood 
170 | Lee A .  Smithey a n d Lester R .  K u rtz
to have been instigated by the regime and should be defined as ille-
gitimate or disproportionate. Sharp (2005) has pointed out that state 
regimes often welcome the use of violent tactics by SMOs because 
it allows them to more easily justify their own use of violence. They 
have been known to deploy agents provocateurs to provoke violence 
by protesters. Indeed, the very fact that repression needs to be justi-
fied signals the presence of countervailing norms calling for limits to 
the use of violence. Working to ensure that those norms prevail is at 
the heart of repression management. Beyond nonviolent discipline, 
however, there are other ways to enhance the likelihood that public 
opinion will shift in favor of social movements or, more precisely, 
shift away from the regime.
Setting the Stage: Framing Collective Identity
Even in apparently asymmetrical conflicts, what Vaclav Havel calls 
the “power of the powerless” can be evoked through effective repres-
sion management that causes the broader public—and sometimes even 
adversaries in a conflict—to reframe and redefine themselves and the 
situation. Framing has been brilliantly developed by what could have 
at one time been called the Texas School of movement scholarship, 
which was initiated by David Snow, Burke Rochford, Steven Worden, 
and Robert Benford (1986, 21), drawing on Goffman’s social theory for 
the study of social movements. Their framing perspective emphasizes 
what Goffman calls the “‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable indi-
viduals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within their 
life space and the world at large” (464). As Benford and Snow (2000, 
214) put it, “Frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful
and thereby function to organize experience and guide action.” The
ability of movement actionists to be successful in having their frame
accepted by their potential audience is profoundly related to “frame
resonance”; that is, the degree to which their preferred frame appeals
to others in that it is credible, salient, and generally produces a positive
response in the intended audience (Benford and Snow 2000, 218).
Effective framing involves an adept handling and reshaping of the 
flow of history in a desired direction. Sørensen and Vinthagen (2012, 
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449–51) emphasize the impact of borrowing powerful symbols, such 
as national flags, religious icons, and even images from popular cul-
ture. This exemplifies one of the most important cultural dynamics of 
contention: symbols, rituals, or other familiar practices may be appro-
priated for insurgent ends. The “worthiness or legitimacy” (Sørensen 
and Vinthagen 2012, 451) associated with the symbols can be trans-
ferred to movements and their claims (Smithey and Young 2010). Dur-
ing the Iraq War, one often saw bumper stickers, banners, and flags 
in the United States proclaiming “Peace is Patriotic” in an attempt by 
antiwar activists to “harness hegemony” (Woehrle, Coy, and Maney 
2008, 34–35). As Tarrow (1988, 118) puts it, “The lesson of the civil 
rights movement is that the symbols of revolt are not drawn like musty 
costumes from a cultural closet and arrayed before the public. Nor are 
new meanings unrolled out of whole cloth. The costumes of revolt 
are woven from a blend of inherited and invented fibers into collective 
action frames in confrontation with opponents and elites.”
Sørensen and Vinthagen (2012) go even further and argue that 
fundamental cultural principles or “‘old’ culture” can be appropriated 
or simply highlighted to elevate the status of nonviolent activists. Jenni 
Williams describes in chapter 6 how the Women of Zimbabwe Arise 
(WOZA) movement borrowed motherhood and Valentines tropes 
from their traditional culture to challenge the Zimbabwean regime. 
WOZA activists claimed authority as mothers to scold the president 
and regime elites for their misbehavior and held major annual demon-
strations on Valentine’s Day to demonstrate their love for their coun-
try and its people.
The consequences of repression for movement mobilization may 
be profoundly affected by how nonviolent actions and repression are 
framed and whose frames dominate cultural discourse both within the 
movement and in the larger society. A movement is more likely to ben-
efit rather than just suffer from repression if it can manage the frames 
through which the repression is interpreted (Woehrle, Coy, and Maney 
2008). The rich literature on the relationship between identity and 
cultural meaning in new social movements has also yielded much new 
understanding about social movement mobilization, but this literature 
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has seldom focused on the actual acts of participation—the tactics and 
methods of movement actors.
In an exception, Kern (2009) draws on Alexander’s cultural prag-
matics, claiming that the Minjung movement in South Korea following 
World War II cultivated a broad, populist Korean identity, includ-
ing a Buddhist messianic vision against which to contrast the state’s 
attempts to consolidate its legitimacy through a cultural “One-People 
Principle” program. Through the deployment of traditional practices 
and rituals, such as dances, music, and recitation, intellectuals and 
artists encouraged mobilization by establishing a frame that not only 
drew distinctions between the state and the people but drew power-
fully on myths and collective memory, thus successfully fusing South 
Koreans’ national identity with the democracy movement’s agenda. 
Activists promoted a framing of Korean history in which the Min-
jung repeatedly challenged repression, a narrative that, through the 
inclusion of traditional practices, was reenacted in each protest. “In 
this way, protest events removed the boundary between the present 
and the (mythic) past; every tear gas grenade that exploded and every 
arrest of activists strengthened the faith of the (mostly) students and 
stimulated further confrontations” (Kern 2009, 311). By successfully 
reviving a widely known agonistic narrative, democracy activists man-
aged to influence the interpretation of contemporary confrontations 
with the state. Because the stage had been set in the minds of South 
Koreans, state repression was more likely to be interpreted according 
to the movement’s framing and lead to mobilization.
In some cases, the preservation and appropriation of histories of 
repression can prepare activists and publics to interpret contemporary 
repression as yet another affront and indignity. Activists in Hungary 
made significant use of historical processions and funerals during resis-
tance to Soviet rule in the late 1980s. On March 15, 1989, one hun-
dred thousand Hungarians participated in a Revolution Day march 
that passed six locations connected with the democratic Hungarian 
revolution of 1848, linking the contemporary movement with a widely 
shared nationalist history. Three months later, another powerfully 
symbolic event was held to commemorate the death of Imre Nagy, a 
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Hungarian communist prime minister, who had supported another 
revolution in 1956 against the Stalinist People’s Republic of Hungary. 
Soviet forces brutally repressed the 1956 revolution, but the resulting 
indignation remained suffused in popular memory and was revived 
when Hungarian demonstrators commemorating Nagy’s death were 
violently dispersed by police in 1988. In 1989, the Communist Party 
had agreed to the reinterment of Nagy’s and other revolutionaries’ 
remains in hopes of appropriating the legacy of the revolution, but 
instead the funeral became a critical opportunity for contemporary 
opposition. Commemorations in Hungary not only tapped into pow-
erful and almost sacred nationalist narratives to rally participation but 
also came to inscribe memories of repression and thus sustained indig-
nation over decades, reminding us that the paradox of repression is 
not limited to discrete events but can accumulate over time, creating a 
rhythm of resistance (Kern 2009; Smithey and Kurtz 1999).
Diagnostic Framing
Benford and Snow (2000, 614) identify three core tasks in the framing 
process: the diagnostic, the prognostic, and the motivational, all of 
which SMO actors use to manage impressions. As they put it, move-
ment adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic 
condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attribu-
tions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set 
of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change.
A major aspect of the diagnostic process is the establishment 
of what William Gamson (1995) calls “injustice frames” that define 
movement participants as victims. Injustice frames are thus a mode 
of interpretation that often precedes “collective noncompliance, pro-
test, and or rebellion” (Benford and Snow 2000, 614). Strategic actions 
can be choreographed to present a diagnosis of a social problem and 
undermine a regime’s authority. If authorities react to the framing 
with repressive measures, they only serve to strengthen the diagnosis. 
Lakey (1973, 103) refers to such actions as “dilemma demonstrations”: 
“The best kind of action is one which puts the opponent in a dilemma: 
whichever response he makes helps the movement. If he allows the 
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demonstration to proceed, the movement gains that opportunity to 
educate the people. If he represses the demonstration, the people are 
awakened further to the underlying nature of the regime.” Thus, the 
repression itself amplifies and dramatizes victimization in a way that 
movement participants cannot do by themselves, and ends up ironi-
cally as a collaborative effort between the regime and its dissidents.
Diagnosis involves identifying not only aspects of the system 
that need change but also the linkage between the repression change 
agents have suffered, on the one hand, and the inherent problems and 
injustice of the system itself, on the other. The violence of the repres-
sion a regime inflicts on a movement is framed as symptomatic of what 
is wrong with the system in the first place. When Major Dyer ordered 
his soldiers to fire on unarmed Indian demonstrators demanding 
Indian independence (demonstrators who were unable to escape the 
courtyard in which they were meeting), it was not, according to Gan-
dhi, a fluke instance of one officer run amok but characteristic of the 
very nature of the colonial system, which was held in place by brutal 
violence and the people’s acceptance of it.
More to the point here, certain tactics can dramatize an issue 
and bring others into the arena. When Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
appeared on NBC’s Meet the Press in 1960, he was asked by his host if it 
would not have been more effective simply to boycott white businesses 
that did not serve “Negro” customers rather than creating the kind of 
confrontation emerging from lunch counter sit-ins.
I think, Mr. Spivak, sometimes it is necessary to dramatize an issue 
because many people are not aware of what is happening, and I think 
the sit-ins serve to dramatize the indignities and the injustices which 
Negro people are facing all over the nation, and I think another 
reason why they are necessary and they are vitally important at this 
point is the fact that they give an eternal refutation to the idea that 
the Negro is satisfied with segregation. If you didn’t have the sit-
ins, you wouldn’t have this dramatic and not only this dramatic but 
this mass demonstration of the dissatisfaction of the Negro with the 
whole system of segregation (King 2005, 434).
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The sit-in strategy was designed to draw attention not only to the 
lunch counters but also to “injustices which negro people are facing all 
over the nation.” When locals attacked activists in department stores, 
King’s indictment of segregation across the South only resonated 
more strongly.
Demonstrators entered the lunchrooms in Nashville anticipating 
that they would be beaten and arrested—it was part of the strategic 
plan developed by Rev. James Lawson, a United Methodist clergyman 
who had returned from three years in India studying Gandhi’s free-
dom movement and was sent by Dr. King to work on desegregation 
campaigns in the American South. The protestors of Jim Crow laws 
thus choreographed their actions in advance to take repression into 
account. They were trained to endure violent attacks from bystand-
ers and arrest by law enforcement officials. In workshops prior to the 
sit-ins, Lawson had them role play various scenarios involving ver-
bal and even physical abuse, thinking carefully about how to respond 
in a disciplined, nonviolent manner so as to ensure that their frame 
prevailed (Isaac et al. 2012). By carefully choreographing (including 
wardrobe), rehearsing, and playing out the lunch counter sit-ins, civil 
rights activists revealed their diagnosis of Jim Crow practices, ensur-
ing that the beatings and arrests that followed would further support 
their injustice frame.
Raising the Cultural Stakes: Representing Deeply Held Identities
Tactics that tap into discourses of national identity, religious commit-
ment, or other affinity can also create a strategic dilemma for repres-
sive regimes. Sørensen and Vinthagen (2012) discuss the paradigmatic 
way in which the Khudai Khidmatgar, a nonviolent army of Islamic 
Pathans led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the British-controlled North-
West Frontier Province drew on Islam and the code of Pukhtunwali to 
mobilize and discipline nonviolent action. The greater jihad or inner 
“struggle” through which Muslims pursue devotion and justice can be 
joined with the lesser jihad of external struggle against enemies in a 
call to nonviolent action. Pukhtunwali sacralized freedom, and thus 
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acts of repression by British authorities (such as otherwise humiliating 
strip searches and beatings) could be reinterpreted as opportunities 
to demonstrate freedom and resistance through disciplined nonvio-
lent resistance. Within their particular cultural context, Khudai Kid-
matgars evoked the paradox of repression as the viciousness of British 
subjugation contrasted starkly with the actions of these nonviolent 
warriors, violating Pukhtunwali and compelling more Pathans to join 
the movement.
When authorities are seen as attacking or disrespecting widely 
shared symbols, they may mobilize people in defense of shared collec-
tive identities. Thus, tactics that symbolically invoke events or prin-
ciples that are deeply embedded in collective memory and identity can 
take on an almost sacred quality and present a dilemma to authorities 
who want to repress a movement but would do so at the risk of offend-
ing a much larger population.
More than 500,000 people attended the funeral of the student 
Jan Palach in Czechoslovakia in 1969. Palach martyred himself 
through self-immolation during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslova-
kia. Twenty years later, civic organizations planned events to com-
memorate his death, essentially reenacting the repression of an earlier 
time and, in a sense, harvesting the indignation of the earlier event 
for contemporary mobilization. Repression of the commemoration in 
1989 only compounded the insult of 1969 and helped to activate the 
paradox of repression. Eda Kriseová (1993, 235) explained how the two 
events became linked in the movement’s favor: “The proud authori-
ties would not allow people to honor the memory of a dead man, and 
by this they had done more to revive his memory than Havel could if 
he had spoken, and perhaps more than a new human torch could have 
done, if one had been lit. Face to face with truncheons, people felt 
even closer to Jan Palach, who had intended his death to be a warning 
against this kind of violence. As if by a miracle, the years all merged 
together.”
This case could also fall into our first category of preparing col-
lective identities, but here we want to focus on how discrete events can 
tap into preexisting core identities and raise the stakes of repression. In 
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another example, Timothy Garton Ash (1993, 80) has said that repres-
sion during the 1989 commemoration of the death of Jan Opletal, who 
was killed by Nazis, was “the spark that set Czechoslovakia alight” 
(quoted in Smithey and Kurtz 1999, 100–101).
Besides these examples of historical significance, simply holding 
certain types of events that are widely considered sacred and have a 
deep emotional connection among the public can improve the chances 
that repression provokes indignation and mass mobilization. Funer-
als and commemorations, such as Imre Nagy’s, Jan Palach’s, and Jan 
Opletal’s, condense meaning (e.g., national pride and, often, religious 
beliefs) into a specific point in time and space. Similarly, candlelight 
vigils and “prayers for peace” at the Church of St. Nicholas in Leipzig 
evoked sacred moments of spiritual reflection among the predomi-
nantly Christian German population during the Peaceful Revolution 
that overthrew the Communist regime in East Germany.
Nonviolent strategy can appropriate cultural values associated 
with individuals’ statuses in much the same way as certain types of 
events. In some cases, the value of religious authority has been lev-
eraged. In June 1968, 130 Brazilian priests organized by Archbishop 
Dom Helder Camara formed a chain and placed themselves between 
police and protesting students (Lakey 1973, 115). In a similar example, 
during the 1986 EDSA Revolution (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) in the 
Philippines, two military factions of the Filipino army engaged in a 
standoff in Manila after one of the factions mutinied and planned to 
overthrow the Marcos government. Archbishop Sin urged the popula-
tion to support the mutiny, and hundreds of thousands of people gath-
ered to intervene in the standoff while trained activists, along with 
nuns and priests, worked to maintain nonviolent discipline and deter 
the military factions from engaging one another (Johansen and Mar-
tin 2008; Schock 2005, 78). In both of these vastly Roman Catholic 
countries, clergy played important roles in managing protesters and 
raising the stakes of repression by authorities. (Even representations 
of iconic and popular figures such as Santa Claus, clowns, and cartoon 
characters can present a challenge to authorities! [Johansen and Mar-
tin 2008].)
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Leveraging Shared Cultural Resources 
and Encouraging Ethical Dilemmas
Finally, tactics can be designed to signal and appropriate ethical norms 
that are shared between challengers and the regime. If those observ-
ing the repression of a movement share certain values with dissidents, 
such as justice, proportionality, or equality, then they are more likely 
to find the movement’s frame resonant. Alternatively, if values are 
shared between elites and the opposition and can be cued through 
the creative choreography of collective action events, repression may 
become less likely, or splits may develop within the regime as agents 
of the state struggle with how to resolve contradictions between state 
policy and their own ethical systems.
Agents of the regime are often placed in a problematic ethical 
dilemma when ordered to carry out repression against unarmed dis-
ciplined nonviolent protesters. Carefully choreographed actions can 
amplify this dilemma by making it more difficult for them to overlook 
ethical or religious proscriptions against killing or harming unarmed 
opponents. The dilemma can dissuade regime leaders from using 
repression or can lead to divisions within the ranks of the regime, 
as some find it prohibitively difficult to violate their own norms. In 
instances when repression does occur, the coercion can be made to 
appear as asymmetrical as possible, further violating ethical norms. In 
the instance of repression during the commemoration of Jan Opletal 
in Czechoslovakia, protesters made their commitment to nonviolent 
discipline clear by chanting, “We have bare hands.” When security 
forces attacked protesters, the incident galvanized the nation.
Activists can tap into prevailing understandings of spirituality, 
citizenship, and gender. While conducting nonviolent trainings in 
Nashville during the equal accommodations campaign, Jim Lawson 
described an instance when a friend of his had been tied to a tree to 
receive a beating from a group of white racists. He began to recite the 
Lord’s Prayer, provoking an argument among the attackers about the 
propriety of beating someone who was praying. The argument among 
Culture and Repression Management | 179
the attackers undermined their ability to act collectively and diffused 
the situation (York 2000).
In the case of the Rosenstrasse wives in Berlin during World War 
II, German women who were intermarried with male Jews demanded 
the release of their husbands, who had been interned. Despite SS troops 
firing warning shots over the crowd, the women would not disperse. 
Ackerman and DuVall (2000, 237) explain, “They knew the soldiers 
would never fire directly at them because they were of German blood. 
Also, arresting or jailing any of the women would have been the rank-
est hypocrisy: According to Nazi theories, women were intellectually 
incapable of political action. So, women dissenters were the last thing 
the Nazis wanted to have Germans hear about, and turning them into 
martyrs would have ruined the Nazi’s self-considered image as the 
protector of motherhood.” Interestingly, in this case it was both chal-
lenging the regime’s ideology concerning women and taking advantage 
of patriarchal norms that managed to reduce the likelihood of repres-
sion. The intermarried women of Berlin became activists out of their 
individual commitments to their husbands, not as part of some larger 
strategic campaign. However, the effect remains significant. Nazi 
officials knew that violent attacks on German women risked violat-
ing fundamental norms of German culture, not to mention revealing 
flaws in Nazi ideology.
Activists can take strategic advantage of cultural norms to enhance 
frame resonance by choreographing their actions in ways that empha-
size the innocence and nobility of nonviolent activists in juxtaposition 
to the brutality of the regime. During the movement to overthrow 
the Guatemalan ruler Jorge Ubico in 1944, nonviolent protests, often 
by students, were met with beatings, guns, and arrest. During dem-
onstrations, campaigners faced guns and tear gas. Women dressed in 
mourning prayed at the church of San Francisco in Guatemala City 
before undertaking a peaceful silent march, highlighting the contrast 
between the violence of the forces and the legitimacy of the insur-
gents. The military fired on the crowd and killed Maria Cincilla Reci-
nos, making her a martyr and icon for the movement. Guatemalans 
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launched a massive general strike in response (Muñoz 2009). The 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina deployed a similar per-
formance of mourning as they publicly demonstrated and pressed the 
military junta to release information about their disappeared children 
and husbands. In both of these cases, traditional tropes from the local 
culture were employed to show potential allies and recruits that those 
calling for change were in fact simply reflecting shared values (Bou-
vard 1994; Malin 1994; Navarro 2001).
Similarly, student civil rights activists in the lunch counter sit-ins 
in Nashville were careful to appear as upstanding citizens, wearing 
their “Sunday best” clothes when engaging in sit-ins or marches. The 
well-dressed, well-mannered, educated young people (segregated by 
gender, so as not to take on interracial romance issues) deliberately 
appeared in stark contrast to the ruffians who beat them up and even 
the police officers who arrested them. Many Nashvillians were out-
raged at the sight of fine young college students being rounded up, 
jailed, and brought into court. If white local ruffians were to harass 
the protesters, and when arrests were imminent, the students wanted 
to ensure that the images captured in the media and absorbed by 
other bystanding African Americans would clearly show that norms of 
respectability and citizenship were being violated. The arrests of these 
students led to the galvanizing of African American resistance and the 
success of widespread economic boycotts (Johansen and Martin 2008).
Campaigns for social change may be more successful when they 
engage in repression management with attention to cultural themes—
choreographing and framing actions that enhance the probability that 
repression will backfire and increase the credibility of and participa-
tion in the movement. This framing can occur both before and after 
the transformative events of repression (see Shultziner, chapter 3): pre-
emptive choreography as a part of strategic planning may help action-
ists to shape the kind of repression they face or, more probably, to 
set the stage for how the event is perceived by relevant actors when it 
occurs. Of course, these actions are not one sided, but part of a fram-
ing contest between insurgents and elites; some authorities are fully 
conscious of the paradox of repression and have gone beyond brute 
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force to use what we call “smart” repression, which we take up in the 
next chapter.
After repressive events take place, civil resisters may facilitate the 
paradox of repression by amplifying the moral outrage (Moore 1978) 
or arousing moral concern (Collins 2009) through effective framing. 
Repression does not backfire unless relevant audiences know about 
it and find it objectionable, potentially triggering negative attitudes 
toward repressive structures and their representatives, on the one 
hand, and positive responses toward the resistance, on the other. If a 
movement’s goals are perceived as resonating with significant elements 
of its cultural context, elites are more likely to defect, and potential 
activists more likely to mobilize. The cultural capital of a nonviolent 
insurgency can be enhanced by civil resisters’ active attention to the 
cultural elements of a conflict, leading to increased participation and 
greater chances of success.
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